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“WHERE CAN I GO?”: EXCESSIVENESS OF THE 
GEOGRAPHICAL RESTRAINTS IMPOSED BY THE SEXUAL 
ASSAULT REFORM ACT IN URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS 
Leslie Anne Mendoza* 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT 
WILLIAMS V. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND 
COMMUNITY SUPERVISION1 
(DECIDED JANUARY 12, 2016) 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine an elderly gentleman who has spent twenty years of 
his life in a correctional facility.  Imagine how he longed for the day 
when he finally gets out; thinking he has already served his time.  
Imagine his yearning for his family, friends, and the place he has 
called home for more than forty years.  Imagine his disappointment 
when he finds out that he is prohibited from visiting not only his 
home but also his lawyer’s office and his treatment programs.  With 
nowhere else to go, he attempts to move into a homeless shelter; only 
to find that being in the shelter is a violation of his parole.  At that 
point, he thinks to himself, “Where can I go?” 
 
*J.D. Candidate, 2017, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.S. Legal 
Management, Ateneo de Manila University, 2014.  I would like to express my sincere 
gratitude for the unconditional love and support of my parents, Wenifredo and Amelia Janet 
Mendoza, as well as my siblings, Loren, Lanz and Louis Mendoza.  I would also like to 
show my deepest appreciation for John Christopher Lopez for his constant encouragement 
and motivation.  Finally, I would like to acknowledge my Note Editor, Rhona Mae 
Amorado, for her valuable guidance and hard work throughout the writing process of this 
Case Note. 
1 24 N.Y.S.3d 18 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2016), appeal docketed, No. APL-2016-00031 
(2016). 
1
Mendoza: "Where Can I Go?"
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017
570 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 33 
Article I, Section 9 of the United States Constitution provides, 
“No . . . ex post facto Law shall be passed.”2  The ex post facto clause 
prohibits retroactive laws that criminalize innocent acts when 
committed, imposes additional punishment for a crime after its 
commission, and alters the evidentiary requirements for a conviction 
to the detriment of the defendant.3  The ex post facto clause generally 
applies to criminal statutes.4  However, it may apply to a civil 
regulatory scheme that is excessively punitive in intent or effect.5  In 
determining whether a statute is punitive in intent or effect, courts 
consider several factors.6  Courts have discretion in considering 
which factor is more significant than the other.7 
Williams, a sex offender on parole, claimed that the Sexual 
Assault Reform Act (SARA)8 violated the ex post facto clause 
because its geographical restraints are so limiting that he is prohibited 
from residing or traveling in the city where he lived before he was 
incarcerated, New York City.9  The Appellate Division, First 
Department, after applying the factors enumerated in the Supreme 
Court case Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,10 reached the conclusion 
 
2 U.S. CONST. art I, § 9. 
3 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388-89 (1798). 
4 Id. 
5 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963). 
6 See infra text accompanying note 95. 
7 Id. 
8 The Sexual Assault Reform Act (hereinafter “SARA”) provides in pertinent part: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, where a 
person serving a sentence for an offense defined in article one hundred 
thirty, one hundred thirty-five or two hundred sixty-three of the penal 
law or section 255.25, 255.26 or 255.27 of the penal law and the victim 
of such offense was under the age of eighteen at the time of such offense 
or such person has been designated a level three sex offender pursuant to 
subdivision six of section one hundred sixty-eight-l of the correction 
law, is released on parole or conditionally released pursuant to 
subdivision one or two of this section, the board shall require, as a 
mandatory condition of such release, that such sentenced offender shall 
refrain from knowingly entering into or upon any school grounds, as that 
term is defined in subdivision fourteen of section 220.00 of the penal 
law, or any other facility or institution primarily used for the care or 
treatment of persons under the age of eighteen while one or more of such 
persons under the age of eighteen are present. 
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-c (14) (McKinney 2016) (emphasis added).  
9 Williams v. Dep’t of Corrs. & Cmty. Supervision, 24 N.Y.S.3d 18, 20-21 (App. Div. 1st 
Dep’t 2016). 
10 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
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that SARA is not punitive in intent or character and does not violate 
the ex post facto clause.11 
Although the Williams court held that SARA does not violate 
the ex post facto clause, there is limited case law that involves the 
constitutionality of SARA with regard to the ex post facto clause as 
applied to parolees in urban neighborhoods.12  This Note suggests 
that there must be an assessment that considers the additional 
limitations of SARA as applied to a densely populated area, which 
makes it unreasonably difficult for a parolee to find suitable housing 
or to travel.  Specifically, this Note will propose conducting 
individual assessments on parolees in urban neighborhoods to prevent 
the potential excessive and unreasonable effect of the SARA.  
This Note will be divided into nine parts.  Part II of this Note 
will discuss the facts and procedural history of Williams.  Part III will 
provide a discussion of its majority opinion and an analysis of the 
Appellate Division’s reasoning in applying the ex post facto clause 
framework outlined in Kennedy.  Part IV will then discuss Justice 
Kapnick’s dissenting opinion.  Parts V and VI will compare ex post 
facto clauses of the United States and New York State Constitutions 
and the analysis applied by the Federal and the New York State 
courts, and discuss SARA’s history and its ex post facto clause 
analysis.  In Part VII, the holding of Williams and its effect on 
parolees in urban neighborhoods will be explored, as well as how the 
court could have reached a more reasonable decision through an 
individualized assessment that takes into consideration both the sex 
offender’s risk of recidivism as well as residency before 
incarceration.  Lastly, Part VIII will provide a summary and a 
suggestion to the New York Court of Appeals and courts which hear 
similar cases. 
II.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On November 21, 1995, Williams was convicted of first 
degree crimes of rape and sodomy, as well as endangering the 
 
11 Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 20. 
12 See Berlin v. Evans, 923 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (N.Y. Cnty. Sup. Ct. 2011) (holding that as 
applied to the low-risk level one sex offender petitioner, SARA violates the prohibition on ex 
post facto laws. In that case, SARA banned Petitioner from his New York City apartment of 
forty years because of the geographical restraints imposed); see discussion infra Section 
VI.B. 
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welfare of a child.13  Williams was sentenced to four concurrent 
terms of seven to twenty-one years.14  He was sixty-four years old 
when he was released to parole supervision on December 20, 2012.15  
His sentence is due for completion on November 18, 2016.16 
Williams’s parole was granted subject to restrictions on his 
place of residence and his travel.17  Under SARA, Williams can 
neither live nor travel within 1000 feet of school grounds.18  Williams 
claimed that this mandatory condition rendered the possibility of 
finding housing within New York City futile.19  For example, 
Williams was living in a homeless shelter for men at Bellevue, but 
that residence violated SARA because it was within the prohibited 
buffer zone.20  Williams also claimed that the travel restrictions made 
it impossible for him to travel within Manhattan to satisfy his 
requirements of visiting his parole officer and his drug and sex 
offender treatment programs and, similarly, made it impossible for 
him to visit his “doctors, lawyers, social workers, friends or 
family.”21  Williams submitted into the record a map entitled 
“Manhattan No-go Zones and Public Bus Network,” which showed 
that a significant area of Manhattan was off-limits to him.22   
As a result, Williams claimed that “SARA violates the Ex 
Post Facto clause of the United States Constitution and his 
substantive due process rights under the Federal and New York State 
Constitutions.”23  He initially filed a hybrid declaratory judgment and 
Article 78 petition.24  The Department of Corrections and Community 
Supervision, in turn, claimed SARA was constitutional and denied 
most of Williams’s assertions about SARA’s ramifications on him.25  
 
13 Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 20-22.  
14 Id. (citing People v. Williams, 682 N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1999)). 
15 Id. at 20. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 20. 
19 Id. 
20 Id.  The Department of Corrections and Community Supervision had formerly placed 
parolees subject to SARA at the Bellevue center; however, it has changed its policy and 
concluded that the shelter was no longer a SARA-compliant residence.  Id. 
21 Id. at 20-21. 
22 Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 20-21. 
23 Id. (capitalization in original). 
24 Id. at 21. 
25 Id. 
4
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The Supreme Court of New York for New York County held that 
SARA was constitutional.26 
III.  THE FIRST DEPARTMENT’S REASONING 
Williams appealed, and the issue before the Appellate 
Division of the First Department was whether SARA’s mandatory 
1000-foot buffer zone violates the ex post facto clause of the United 
States Constitution.27  The 1000-foot buffer zone bars sex offender 
parolees from living or traveling near areas where children usually 
gather such as schools and parks.28  The ex post facto clause prohibits 
states from passing laws that impose additional punishments for past 
offenses.29  “Two critical elements must be present for a criminal or 
penal law to be ex post facto: it must be retrospective, that is, it must 
apply to events occurring before its enactment, and it must 
disadvantage the offender affected by it.”30  In this case, there was no 
contention as to the retrospective character of SARA which was both 
passed and amended years after the conviction of Williams and 
imposes compulsory limitations on him as a parolee.31  
To determine whether a retrospective enactment violates the 
ex post facto clause, the Appellate Division applied an intent-effects 
test.32  The first step was to ascertain whether the intent of the 
Legislature was to enact a punitive statute or a nonpunitive civil 
regulatory scheme.33  If the legislative intent of the statute was to 
impose punishment, then the retroactive enactment violates the ex 
post facto clause.34  If a civil regulatory scheme was intended, then 
the court must decide whether its purpose or effect is so extensively 
punitive that it negates the State’s civil intention.35   
Based on SARA’s text and legislative history and its 
amendments, the Appellate Division concluded that the statute was 
intended to be a civil regulatory scheme for the protection of children 
 
26 Id.  
27 Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 20. 
28 Id. 
29 Kellogg v. Travis, 796 N.E.2d 467, 469 (N.Y. 2003). 
30 Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1980). 
31 Id. at 9. 
32 Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 23; see discussion infra Section VI.B. 
33 Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 23 (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003)). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
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from sexual predators.36  The court concluded that the residential and 
travel restrictions found in the statute’s text were limited to areas 
where children were expected to be and to times when children were 
there.37  In addition, the restriction only applies to sex offenders 
whom the Legislature thinks were highly likely to reoffend against 
child victims.38  It is evident from the language of the statute that the 
Legislature intended to protect children rather than punish 
offenders.39   
Nonetheless, Williams argued that SARA was punitive in 
intent because it incorporated the definition of “school grounds” 
provided by Penal Law § 220.00(14),40 and because the statute only 
applied to parolees.41  The court rejected this argument.42  It reasoned 
that the reference to the Penal Law was insufficient to show criminal 
intent.43  The court also pointed out that SARA imposes no additional 
restrictions or punishment on parolees.44  For these reasons, the court 
concluded that SARA was not intended to be punitive.45 
The court thereafter considered whether the scheme was so 
punitive in its effect or purpose as to run afoul of the State’s intention 
for it to be a civil statutory scheme.46  In determining whether a 
statute is punitive in purpose or effect, courts consider seven 
 
36 Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 23. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 School grounds is defined as: 
(a) in or on or within any building, structure, athletic playing field, 
playground or land contained within the real property boundary line of a 
public or private elementary, parochial, intermediate, junior high, 
vocational, or high school, or (b) any area accessible to the public 
located within one thousand feet of the real property boundary line 
comprising any such school or any parked automobile or other parked 
vehicle located within one thousand feet of the real property boundary 
line comprising any such school. For the purposes of this section an 
“area accessible to the public” shall mean sidewalks, streets, parking 
lots, parks, playgrounds, stores and restaurants. 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.00(14) (McKinney 2009). 
41 Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 25. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 25. 
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factors.47  The court in Williams identified five factors relevant to the 
case.48  The five factors were whether the restriction was an 
imposition of affirmative disability or restraint; has been historically 
regarded as punishment; promotes traditional aims of punishment; 
has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; and was excessive 
with respect to its nonpunitive purpose.49 
The court agreed with Williams that SARA’s geographical 
restrictions are affirmative restraints, can be historically regarded as 
punishment, and promote deterrence, which is a traditional goal of 
punishment.50  The geographical restraints SARA imposes are 
affirmative and may be compared to “banishment” or a way of 
compelling a person to leave a place for a certain amount of time.51  
Historically, banishment has been viewed as criminal punishment.52  
While SARA’s restraint on residence and travel is akin to 
banishment, the court noted that this label was insignificant as a way 
of establishing punitive effect.53  The court reasoned that these factors 
were inadequate because SARA only applies to parolees who have 
limited liberty rights.54  Therefore, the court disagreed with Williams 
and held that SARA is not punitive in effect.55  Moreover, the court 
also rejected Williams’s argument that, because SARA promotes 
traditional goals of punishment, it is punitive.56  The court reasoned 
that promoting a traditional goal of punishment does not necessarily 
entail that a statute is a criminal penalty.57 
The Williams court deemed the last two factors, rational 
connection to a nonpunitive purpose and excessiveness, most 
important in determining whether SARA has a punitive effect.58  
 
47 Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003) (citation omitted) 
(explaining that these factors are neither exhaustive nor dispositive and are only guidelines 
in determining whether a retroactive law is punitive and consequently violates the ex post 
facto clause); see also infra text accompanying note 95 (enumerating the factors of the 
intent-effects test). 
48 Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 25. 
49 Id.  
50 Id. at 26. 
51 Id. (citing United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905)). 
52 Id. at 27 (citing Kennedy, 372 U.S. 144 at n.23 (1963)). 
53 Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 27. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 25.  
56 Id. at 27. 
57 Id. 
58 Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 28. 
7
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“SARA’s legitimate governmental interest is the protection of 
children against people proven to be capable of committing sex 
crimes.”59  SARA’s rationale is that limiting access to children would 
greatly reduce the likelihood of sex offenders reoffending.60  Thus, 
there is a rational connection between SARA’s nonpunitive intent 
and its effect.  As for excessiveness, Williams argued that the statute 
was punitive because there were no individualized risk assessments 
relative to the restrictions.61  Williams further argued that the 
restrictions applied to all sex offenders on parole, even those who 
have not shown any risk of reoffending.62  However, the court 
rejected these arguments and reasoned that SARA only applies to 
parolees who have limited liberty rights, and thus, its “restraints are 
not of a sufficient magnitude to require individualized 
assessments.”63  In addition, SARA applies only to level 3 sex 
offenders under the New York State Sex Offender Registration Act 
(SORA).64  This limits SARA’s application to those who are most 
likely to reoffend among sex offenders and not to all sex offenders on 
parole.65 
The Appellate Division for the First Department held that 
SARA and its amendments did not violate the ex post facto clause of 
the United States Constitution because it is a retrospective civil 
regulatory scheme that is neither punitive in intent nor effect.66 
IV.  DISSENTING OPINION 
Justice Kapnick dissented in part and disagreed with the 
majority’s holding that the statute is not punitive in effect and does 
not violate the ex post facto clause of the United States 
Constitution.67  She opined that the 1000-foot buffer zone is a 
retroactive punishment and the civil intent of SARA is negated by the 
statute’s punitive effect.68  She also emphasized the unrebutted 
 
59 Id. 
60 Id.  
61 Id. at 30. 
62 Id. 
63 Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 31. 
64 N.Y. CORR. LAW § 168 et seq. (McKinney 1996). 
65 Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 31. 
66 Id. at 20. 
67 Id. at 32 (Kapnick, J., dissenting). 
68 Id. 
8
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evidence that Williams was banned from living in or traveling to 
almost all parts of Manhattan, where Williams lived for more than 
twenty years prior to his incarceration, as well as to large areas of the 
other boroughs of New York City.69  SARA also requires Williams to 
enter prohibited zones to satisfy his requirements as a parolee such as 
to visit his parole officer and his substance abuse and sex offender 
treatment programs.70   
Justice Kapnick found that there was not enough factual 
evidence to show that the 1000-foot buffer around schools has a 
rational connection to the legitimate state interest of keeping sex 
offenders away from children.71  She added that there was also a lack 
of rational relationship between SARA and its stated purpose to the 
effect that it only applies to parolees when there is no reference or 
data suggesting parolees are more likely to reoffend than those 
released without parole.72  Finally, Justice Kapnick also found the 
statute to be excessive in relation to its purpose as SARA applies to 
level 3 sex offenders under SORA regardless of the age of their 
victims and that the geographical restraints are effective twenty-four 
hours a day, 365 days a year.73  For these reasons, she concluded that 
SARA was punitive in effect, and thus, violates the ex post facto 
clause.74 
V.  THE FEDERAL APPROACH  
A.  The Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States 
Constitution 
Article I, Section 9 of the United States Constitution provides, 
“No . . . ex post facto Law shall be passed.”75  Any statute, which 
criminalizes an act that was legal when committed, which imposes 
additional or harsher punishment after its commission, or which 
deprives a criminal defendant of any legal defense available at the 
 
69 Id. at 32. 
70 Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 32 (Kapnick, J., dissenting). 
71 Id. at 33-34. 
72 Id. at 34. 
73 Id. 
74 Id.  
75 U.S. CONST. art I, § 9. 
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time when the act was committed, is prohibited under the 
Constitution as ex post facto.76  
When the Constitution was adopted, ex post facto laws were 
considered to “embrace all retrospective laws, or laws governing, or 
controlling past transactions, whether they are of a civil or a criminal 
nature.”77  The plain meaning and intention of the prohibition on ex 
post facto laws are that legislatures of states shall not pass laws after 
a person commits an act and that the law should not impose 
punishment on that person for having done such act.78  However, this 
prohibition may not be evaded by passing a civil measure that is 
essentially criminal.79  Generally, ex post facto laws are known to 
apply to acts of a criminal nature only.80  The prohibition applies to 
all laws that declare an act criminal when the act was not criminal 
when committed; or aggravate the punishment of a crime already 
committed; or lessen or set a different quantum of evidence necessary 
to convict an offender than what was required when the act was 
committed.81  All of these are prohibited for being “manifestly unjust 
and oppressive.”82 
B.  Intent-Effects Test  
To determine whether the ex post facto clause is violated, 
federal courts first ascertain whether a retroactive statute is intended 
to impose punishment or to establish a civil proceeding.83  If it is 
punitive, then it is automatically a violation of the ex post facto 
clause.84  If it is civil and nonpunitive, then courts further examine 
whether the statute is so extensively punitive, either in purpose or 
effect, that it negates the State’s intention for it to be a civil 
regulatory scheme.85  The federal courts “ordinarily defer to the 
 
76 Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (2001) (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 
(1925)). 
77 JOSEPH STORY, J., COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 485 
(1833). 
78 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798). 
79 Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381 (1878). 
80 STORY, supra note 77.  
81 STORY, supra note 77. 
82 Calder, 3 U.S. at 386. 
83 Smith, 538 U.S. at 92. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
10
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legislature’s stated intent[;]”86 thus, “ ‘only the clearest proof’ will 
suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been 
denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.”87  In 
determining whether the effects of a statute are punitive, courts are 
also guided by the factors established in Kennedy.88 
In Kennedy, certain sections of the Nationality Act of 1940 
were challenged.89 The United States brought actions against two 
native-born citizens of the United States who left the country 
allegedly to evade the military draft service obligations.90  As a result, 
both were denied access to the United States on the ground that they 
lost their citizenship by remaining outside the jurisdiction of the 
country during the war for the purpose of evading service in the 
Nation’s armed forces.91  On appeal, the appellate court found that 
the statutes were unconstitutional.92  On review, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the appellate court’s decision concluding that the statutes 
were punitive in nature and lacked the procedural standards the 
Constitution required.93 
In determining whether an Act of Congress is penal or 
regulatory, the Supreme Court established factors that must be 
considered in relation to the statute, on its face, if there is no 
conclusive evidence of congressional intent.94  These factors are:  
whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability 
or restraint; whether it has historically been regarded 
as a punishment; whether it comes into play only on a 
finding of scienter; whether its operation will promote 
the traditional aims of punishment -- retribution and 
deterrence; whether the behavior to which it applies is 
already a crime; whether an alternative purpose to 
which it may rationally be connected is assignable for 
 
86 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1996). 
87 Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100 (1997). 
88 Smith, 538 U.S. at 97. 
89 Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 147. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 148. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 165. 
94 Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169. 
11
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it; and whether it appears excessive in relation to the 
alternative purpose assigned . . . .95    
The Supreme Court further noted that an examination of these factors 
may result in different outcomes.96  Although the Court in Kennedy 
did not go into the details of these factors and based its decision on 
congressional debates regarding the punitive nature of the statute, 
many federal courts continue to apply the Kennedy factors.97 
Forty years later, in Smith v. Doe,98 the United States Supreme 
Court illustrated the application of the Kennedy factors in cases 
involving laws regulating the activity of sexual offenders and the 
prohibition against ex post facto laws.99  The statute at issue in Smith 
was Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act, which required persons 
convicted of sex and child-kidnapping offenses to register with state 
or local law enforcement authorities and provide information such as 
their names and addresses which the authorities made public.100  The 
statute applied retroactively to offenders who had been convicted 
before the law’s enactment.101  Two such individuals brought an ex 
post facto action and sought to have the statute declared void as 
applied to them.102  The district court granted summary judgment 
against the offenders who appealed.103  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that the statute was 
intended to be a nonpunitive civil regulatory scheme, but held that its 
effects were punitive.104  Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that the Act 
violated the ex post facto clause.105 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, holding that the statute did not 
violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws despite the statute’s 
retroactive application to offenders who were convicted before the 
 
95 Id. at 168-69. 
96 Id. at 169. 
97 Id. See, e.g., Hudson v. U.S., 522 U.S. 93 (1997); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986); 
Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2009); Abuzaid v. Mattox, 726 F.3d 311 (2d Cir. 
2013). 
98 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
99 Id. at 89, 97. 
100 Id. at 90. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 91. 
103 Smith, 538 U.S. at 91. 
104 Id. at 91-92. 
105 Id. at 92. 
12
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enactment of the statute.106  The Court reasoned that Alaska’s 
legislature intended to create a civil and nonpunitive scheme and 
those challenging the statute were not able to show, by the clearest 
proof, that the statute’s effect was so punitive that it negated its 
nonpunitive intent.107 
The United States Supreme Court noted that the framework 
necessary for determining whether a law constituted retroactive 
punishment forbidden by the ex post facto clause was well 
established.108  First, it was necessary to ascertain the intent of the 
legislature to impose punishment or civil proceedings.109  If the 
statute was intended to impose punishment, then it violates the ex 
post facto prohibition.110  On the other hand, if a nonpunitive 
regulatory scheme was intended, then it was necessary to further 
ascertain whether the scheme’s effects were so punitive as to negate 
its civil intent.111  If the effect of the statute is deemed to be punitive, 
the statute is unconstitutional for violating the ex post facto clause.112 
C.  Banishment  
It is not unusual for sex offender statutes to be challenged as 
violations of the ex post facto clause because the restraints the 
statutes impose are akin to banishment.113  Banishment is defined as 
“a punishment inflicted upon criminals, by compelling them to quit a 
city, place, or country, for a specific period of time, or for life.”114  
Historically, banishment has been regarded as punishment of the 
most severe kind.115  In the case of Doe v. Pataki, the district court 
held that the public notification provisions of SORA constituted 
punishment and violated the ex post facto clause.116  One reason for 
the court’s holding was that history suggested that public notification 
 
106 Id. at 92, 105-06. 
107 Id. at 105-06. 
108 Smith, 538 U.S at 92. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 See Roe v. Office of Adult Probation, 125 F.3d 47, 52, 55 (2d Cir. 1997) (In Roe, the 
petitioner claimed that he was asked to leave by his landlord and he was ostracized at his 
workplace due to the notification system being put into effect). 
114 United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 269 (1905) (Brewer, J., dissenting). 
115 Id.  
116 Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 605 (1996), rev’d, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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was punitive as it was akin to branding and other public forms of 
shaming used to punish offenders;117 banishment was imposed for 
more severe offenses.118  However, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed and held that SORA did not impose punishment, 
but merely conditions for the protection of the general public. 119 
VI.  NEW YORK STATE APPROACH  
Article III, Section 1 of the New York State Constitution 
provides, “The legislative power of this state shall be vested in the 
senate and assembly.”120  The legislature may “make acts criminal 
which before were innocent, and ordain punishment in future cases 
where before none could have been inflicted.  This, in its nature, is a 
legislative power, which, by the Constitution of the state, is 
committed to the discretion of the legislative body.”121  However, the 
inalienable rights secured by the Constitution limit the New York 
State legislature.122  Accordingly, with regard to ex post facto laws, 
the New York State applies the limitations and prohibitions set forth 
in Article I, Section 9 of the United States Constitution.123  It 
provides, “No State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law.”124 
A.  Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA) 
SARA provides that sex offenders released on parole are 
required,  
[a]s a mandatory condition of such release[,] . . . [to] 
refrain from knowingly entering into or upon any 
school grounds . . . or any other facility or institution 
primarily used for the care or treatment of persons 
under the age of eighteen while one or more of such 
persons under the age of eighteen are present.125   
 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 See Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997). 
120 N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
121 Id. 
122 Lawton v. Steele, 23 N.E. 878, 878 (N.Y. 1890). 
123 U.S. CONST. art I, § 10. 
124 Id. 
125 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-c (14) (McKinney 2015). 
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The statute’s legislative history supports that it was enacted to keep 
sex offenders away from children and not to impose additional 
punishment on sex offenders for their past criminal acts.126  The 
memoranda of the State Education Department, the New York 
Attorney General and the sponsor of the bill, Assemblyman Harvey 
Weisenberg, all expressed the goal of the statute to protect children 
from threats posed by sex offenders.127 
SARA was first enacted in 2000, and its geographical 
restrictions only applied to sex offenders convicted of certain 
enumerated offenses and whose victims were under eighteen years 
old when the crime was committed.128  The restriction on entering 
school grounds applied twenty-four hours a day, while the restriction 
on other facilities only applied when children were present.129  “A 
violation of SARA was a violation of parole”; however, no separate 
sanction was provided for a violation.130 
In 2005, SARA was amended to expand the definition of 
“school grounds” and incorporated the definition found in Penal Law 
§ 220.00.131  SARA was also amended to cover sex offenders 
classified as high risk, level 3 sex offenders under SORA and to 
apply the geographical restraints regardless of the victims’ age.132  
The statute does not expressly mention any residential restraints, but 
the expanded definition of “school grounds” is found to operate as a 
restriction on both residence and travel.133 
B.  SARA and the Intent-Effects Test in New York 
State 
New York State courts mirror the analysis of federal courts 
when it comes to determining whether a statute violates the 
prohibition on ex post facto laws.134  SARA establishes restraints 
similar to SORA restraints, and thus, the ex post facto clause analysis 
 
126 Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 23. 
127 Id.  
128 Id. at 21. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 21. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 24. 
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of SORA in People v. Parilla135 is identical to the one applied in 
Williams.  In analyzing the statute’s effects and determining whether 
they are punitive, the court used the seven Kennedy factors.136  
However, the court in Parilla noted that the United States Supreme 
Court has not indicated which factors are more significant than 
others; thus, no one factor is determinative.137 
In addition, in Berlin v. Evans,138 the Supreme Court of New 
York in New York County applied the same ex post facto clause 
analysis to the geographical restraints imposed by SARA on an 
elderly gentleman with a prior sex conviction who was prohibited 
from returning to his New York City apartment.139  In Berlin, the 
court applied the framework outlined in Smith in determining 
whether the statute at issue violated the ex post facto clause.140  
VII.   DISCUSSION 
Williams v. Department of Corrections and Community 
Supervision raised the issue of whether the 1000-foot buffer zone 
provided in New York’s SARA is a violation of the ex post facto 
clause because it is unreasonable and excessive when applied to sex 
offender parolees residing in urban neighborhoods such as New York 
City.141  It is unlikely that SARA would be held unconstitutional for 
excessiveness due to the deference to legislative intent of civil 
regulatory schemes given by the courts.142 
After assessing the various federal and state cases applying 
the Kennedy factors, it is reasonable to conclude that the court in 
Williams correctly held that SARA does not violate the constitutional 
 
135 970 N.Y.S.2d 497 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2013) (holding that SORA and its registration 
and notification requirements were not punitive in nature and did not violate the ex post facto 
clause). 
136 Id. at 497. 
137 Id. at 501. 
138 923 N.Y.S.2d 828 (N.Y. Cnty. Sup. Ct. 2011) (holding that SARA was punitive in 
nature and violated the ex post facto clause as applied to a parolee who was seventy-seven 
years old, a first-time offender, and a low-risk, level 1 sex offender.  The court reasoned that 
the absence of individual assessment rendered the statute punitive). 
139 Id. at 834-35. 
140 Id. at 834 (showing the Berlin court’s indirect application of the Kennedy factors by 
applying the Smith framework); see supra note 98 and accompanying text (illustrating the 
Smith court’s application of the Kennedy factors). 
141 Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 18. 
142 Id. at 20. 
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prohibition on ex post facto laws.143  Courts have also held that 
SORA, which is similar to SARA in many aspects, does not impose 
punishment, and thus, is not a violation of the ex post facto clause.144  
In addition, SORA’s public notification registry does not result in the 
banishment of sexual offenders in their communities.145  The 
exclusion sexual offenders experience as a result of SORA, such as 
the eviction by a landlord or community pressure to move, are private 
actions and, however unfortunate, were not intended by the New 
York legislature when SORA was enacted.146    
However, SARA is distinguishable from SORA in that SARA 
expressly prohibits parolees from residing or traveling within 1000 
feet of a place where children often congregate.147  Thus, this 
involves state action that results in the removal of the parolee from 
his community and consequently, banishment.148  Moreover, there is 
apparently no case precedent to show that a 1000-foot buffer zone in 
an urban neighborhood can be considered excessive to the extent that 
it is punitive for making it unreasonably difficult for sex offender 
parolees to find suitable housing and travel within the city.149  A 
geographic restraint with a 1000-foot radius can result in banishment 
in highly urbanized areas such as New York City, which is what 
happened in the Williams case.150 
When Williams raised the argument of banishment, the court 
did not provide sufficient reasoning to support the finding that the 
geographical restraints of SARA are not punishment.151  The court 
simply reasoned that its resemblance to “banishment” is only a label 
that does little to prove punitive effect.152  However, the geographical 
restraints imposed result in an excessive and unreasonable limitation 
 
143 Id. 
144 Parilla, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 499.  The defendant in this case argued that the SORA was 
punitive in nature and violated the ex post facto clause because the statute imposed more 
stringent registration and notice requirements for convicted sex offenders.  Id.   
145 Id. at 503. 
146 Pataki, 120 F.3d at 1284. 
147 Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 23. 
148 Parilla, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 503 (“[B]anishment involved state action in removing the 
offender from a locality . . . .”). 
149 See supra note 12 (Apart from the New York Supreme Court case, Berlin, there is no 
case that discusses similar issues in Williams.  Thus, there is no binding authority on the 
New York Court of Appeals on defendant’s appeal). 
150 Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 26-27. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 27. 
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on parolees who have already done their time.  Thus, the courts 
should highly consider focusing more on excessiveness as a factor in 
determining whether SARA is punitive.  Accordingly, an 
individualized assessment can prevent this unreasonable and 
excessive burden on the parolee.  Although the Williams court 
already rejected such a proposal because parolees have limited 
liberties, it is still necessary to consider the effects of the restraint as 
applied to a parolee.153 
The residential restrictions imposed by SARA only apply 
when certain offenses are committed and if the victim was under 18 
years old at the time of the crime.154  However, if the offender is 
determined to be a level three sex offender, the residential restrictions 
are applied regardless of the victim’s age due to the high risk of 
recidivism.155  SARA adopts the three-tier SORA Risk Assessment 
Instrument in considering the risk of recidivism of each sex 
offender.156  In that regard, the individual assessment that courts 
should apply must include an assessment that not only addresses the 
recidivism of the sex offender but also his residency before 
incarceration.  It is not surprising that residency restrictions cause sex 
offenders to be homeless due to the inability to find law-compliant 
housing.157  There are studies that show that the residency restrictions 
only force sex offenders to slip to the “fringes of society,” which may 
later be problematic since “community reintegration, therapy, and 
stability help reduce recidivism among the majority of offenders.”158  
This takes into account both the dangers that sex offenders pose to 
 
153 Id. at 31. 
154 Id. at 21. 
155 Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 21. 
156 See N.Y. St. Unified Ct. Sys., Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment 
Guidelines and Commentary, http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/06_SORAGuidelines.pdf 
(discussing the factors in determining a sex offender’s level of risk) (last visited Feb. 16, 
2017). 
157 Joseph Goldstein, Housing Restrictions Keep Sex Offenders in Prison Beyond Release 
Dates, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/22/nyregion/with-new-
limits-on-where-they-can-go-sex-offenders-are-held-after-serving-sentences.html?_r=0 
(illustrating how a previously convicted sex offender is forced to live in a homeless shelter 
and even potentially be asked to leave the homeless shelter due to limited facilities and its 
proximity to schools or places where children congregate). 
158 Amanda Moghaddam, Comment, Popular Politics and Unintended Consequences: The 
Punitive Effect of Sex Offender Residency Statutes from an Empirical Perspective, 40 SW. L. 
REV. 223, 236 (2010); see also Jill S. Levenson & Leo P. Cotter, The Impact of Sex Offender 
Residence Restrictions: 1,000 Feet From Danger or One Step From Absurd?, 1 International 
J. of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 168-78 (2005).  
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children in communities and the potential for rehabilitation of sex 
offenders.159 
This proposed solution would yield a different result in 
Williams.  If the assessment found that the 1000-foot barrier is unduly 
restrictive and burdensome to the parolee, then a court would 
determine whether to give more leeway to the parolee by putting 
more weight on whether the statute is excessive.160  Given that 
Williams was barred from finding suitable housing and from 
traveling in New York City, the place where he lived before he was 
incarcerated, the Williams court would have taken this excessive 
burden into consideration and would have allowed Williams to access 
places within SARA’s 1000-foot radius restriction.     
VIII.    CONCLUSION 
Williams v. Department of Corrections and Community 
Supervision concerned an issue of first impression of whether 
SARA’s geographical restraints in an urban neighborhood were 
punitive in intent and effect, and thus, a violation of the ex post facto 
clause.161  In determining whether a statute violates the ex post facto 
clause, courts use the factors established in Kennedy.162  Statutes 
involving ex post facto claims are not exactly alike, and courts have 
the discretion to decide which factors to emphasize because the 
factors are only guidelines.163  As a result, the courts more often than 
not give deference to the legislature and uphold the constitutionality 
of the law.164  
The Williams court rejected the argument that the statute is 
akin to banishment without considering the repercussions on a 
parolee living in an urban neighborhood such as Manhattan.165  The 
New York Court of Appeals and courts hearing similar cases should 
take the density of an urban neighborhood into consideration in 
assessing whether the restraints are so excessive that they impose 
additional punishment for the parolee.  SARA was enacted with the 
 
159 See LEVENSON, supra note 158, at 173. 
160 See discussion, supra Section VI.B. 
161 Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 31. 
162 372 U.S. at 168. 
163 See discussion, supra Section VI.B. 
164 See discussion, supra Section VII. 
165 Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 27. 
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aim of protecting children from sex offenders.166  However, as Judge 
Damon Keith, in his dissenting opinion, articulated in Doe v. 
Bredesen,167 “We must be careful, in our rush to condemn one of the 
most despicable crimes in our society, not to undermine the freedom 
and constitutional rights that make our nation great.”168 
 
 
166 See discussion infra Section VI.A. 
167 521 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2008) (The issue in this case was whether the ex post facto 
clause was violated by the Registration Act and Surveillance Act for sexual offenders). 
168 521 F.3d 680, 681 (6th Cir. 2008) (Keith, J., dissenting). 
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